Response to: “Laws of Nature and Hume’s Problem of Induction” by Alexander Bozzo

“Laws of Nature and Hume’s Problem of Induction,” Alexander Bozzo, Marquette University

David Hume places pressure on the justification of inductive arguments with the so-called problem of induction. Relevant to this discussion is Hume’s denial of any knowledge of a necessary connection implicit in causation. Hume suggests that the subjective probability of billiard ball a’s striking b in circumstances c in manner k is highly improbable. But we can ask: What’s the probability of consecutively witnessing billiard balls moving in manner k given the same initial circumstances c? Indeed, given the probability calculus, the probability of such uniform occurrences is extremely improbable. In this paper, I argue that the best explanation of this data is that laws of nature exist, guaranteeing the realization of such large improbabilities; and that, once admitted, the problem of induction no longer constitutes a serious threat.