Rorty and James on Irony, Moral Commitment, and the Ethics of Belief

This paper highlights commonalities in the thought of James and Rorty around a melioristic ethics of belief that foregrounds a distinctly pragmatic interrelation of choice, commitment, and responsibility. Its aim is to develop the combination of epistemic modesty and willingness to listen and learn from others with an account of ethical responsiveness as a signal contribution of their pragmatism. Reading them as philosophers of agency and commitment brings into view shared ethical and epistemological assumptions that have received little attention. Despite differences in perspective, the pluralistic, "unfinished" universe heralded by James and the contingent, linguistically-mediated, endlessly redescribable landscape embraced by Rorty, both authorize a space of freedom that rejects determinism and the philosophically necessary and demands active choice and self-created commitment. Both reject an ethics that appeals to fixed principles; yet they nonetheless combine their fallibilism and pluralism with an account of commitment and responsibility.